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capacities and the amoral nature of the world, which does not systematically connect virtue with proportionate happiness, it remains unclear how we are to establish the highest good. Yet, if there were an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent author of the world who is at the same time a holy, beneficent and just world ruler, i.e., God according to moral theism, such a being could supplement our limited endeavours and complete the realisation of the highest good.
Since theoretical reason cannot demonstrate the impossibility of God's existence and rational faith in God does not conflict with theoretical reason, we are justified in assuming the existence of God . Moreover, Kant argues that rational faith in God is the only cognitive pathway for understanding how the highest good is to be brought about. Hence, he concludes that we have to believe in God . Faith in God is thus grounded in the necessity of being able to think the possibility of the highest good so that we can rationally execute the commands of the moral law. 21 Precisely for this reason, Kant argues that faith in God is morally necessary and that morality inevitably leads to religion (KPV V:125, RGV VI:6) in this sense that religion, while not being necessary for grounding the principles of morality, is necessary for rendering the completion of the final object of morality intelligible. Consequently, Kant contends that if one doubts the possibility of God's existence, one has to give up the highest good and consequently 'hold all moral laws for empty imagination' (R XVIII:556).
KANT'S VIEWS ON ATHEISM Throughout his different Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion and Reflexionen,
Kant discusses two kinds of atheism: sceptical atheism or 'Ohnegötterei' and dogmatic atheism or 'Gottesläugnung' (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:171). 23 Whereas the sceptical atheist denies all knowledge (Erkenntnis) and conviction (Überzeugung) of God's existence and thus rejects all (speculative) proofs for God's existence (Dasein) , the dogmatic atheist denies the possibility of (the concept of the existence) of God itself (R XVIII:520) 24 and contends that 'there is no God' (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1171). 25 In other words, 'the dogmatic atheist (the denier of God) denies the possibility [of God's existence], the sceptical atheist (the one who is without Godship) denies all evidence of [God's] existence. The former [denies] the concept, the latter [denies] the ground of proof' (R XVIII:541). 26 The sceptical atheist thus considers speculative arguments as insufficient for proving God's existence (VTh /Volckmann XXVIII:1175) . 27 Yet, at the same time, he also recognises that such arguments fail to prove that God does not exist (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1151). 28 For this reason, Kant 5 argues that the sceptical atheist can be convinced to adopt rational faith in God on the basis of moral considerations (V-Th/Volckmann XXVIII:1175). 29 In spite of the insufficiency of speculative proofs of God's existence, Kant thinks that we cannot doubt God's existence for this reason for we still have 'practical proofs' (V-Th/Baumbach XXVIII:1257). The sceptical atheist thus regards God not merely as a logical but as a real possibility from a practical point of view and as a speculatively permissible and morally necessary hypothesis 'since the moral laws find a surer entry thereby, and are more easily followed' (V-MS/Vigilantius XXVII:530).
By contrast, the dogmatic atheist radically denies the existence of God: he regards it neither as a logical, nor as a real possibility. Although speculative arguments cannot establish that God exists, they can thus neither establish that God does not exist. Moreover, it is cognitively legitimate to assume the possibility of God's existence and the moral theist finds in pure practical reason convincing moral grounds for embracing faith in God and affirming his existence. The dogmatic atheist, on the other hand, commits an intellectual error in denying the possibility of God's existence for he claims to know the unknowable and to be able to prove a priori the improvable. 35 Kant's theoretical rejection of dogmatic atheism also affects his moral view of it. Kant concludes that dogmatic atheists are morally evil and that their will is corrupted for they affirm that God does not exist while they ought to recognise that they have no ground for doing so. In this respect, Kant once again contrasts the sceptical with the dogmatic atheist.
From a moral point of view, sceptical atheists are far better off than dogmatic atheists for the former 'who have fallen into atheism through speculation should not be so readily condemned for wickedness […] ; only their understanding was corrupted, not their will' (italics added) (VMo/Collins XXVII:311). 36 Kant thus reasons that if the 'logical ground' for atheism does not hold, the dogmatic atheist thus 'denies God from wantonness [muthwillig] and lack of respect for the better conviction' and thus embraces a 'moral ground' for his atheism (V-PP/Herder XXVII:11). 37 In the next section, I shall examine one specific kind of 'wickedness of the heart', viz. abandoning the highest good and lapsing into moral despair.
KANT'S MORAL DESPAIR ARGUMENT: ANALYSIS AND REPLY
Kant's criticism that atheism leads to moral despair is most fiercely expressed in the Critique of Judgment, where Kant conceives of 'a righteous man' who is convinced that there is no
God and who would merely unselfishly try to establish the highest good (KU 5:452 ). Yet, so
Kant argues, his effort is limited; and from nature he can, to be sure, expect some contingent assistance here and there, but never a lawlike agreement in accordance with constant rules […] with the ends to act in behalf of which he feels himself bound and impelled.
Deceit, violence, and envy will always surround him, even though he is himself honest, peaceable, and benevolent; and the righteous ones besides himself that he will still encounter will, in spite of all their worthiness to be happy, nevertheless be subject by nature, which pays no attention to that, to all the evils of poverty, illnesses, and untimely death, […] and will always remain thus until one wide grave engulfs them all together (whether honest or dishonest, it makes no difference here) and flings them […] back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were drawn. -
The end, therefore, which this well-intentioned person had and should have had before his eyes in his conformity to the moral law, he would certainly have to give up as impossible; or, if he would remain attached to the appeal of his inner moral vocation and not weaken the respect, by which the moral law immediately influences him to obedience, by the nullity of the only idealistic final end that is adequate to its high demand (which cannot occur without damage to the moral disposition), then he must assume the existence of a moral author of the world, i.e., of God, from a practical point of view, i.e., in order to form a concept of at least the possibility of the final end that is prescribed to him by morality. Marina echoes Kant's argument that the moral subject rejecting faith in God 'would eventually have to collapse in despair' as follows:
For she would have to believe that she, and other individuals like her, were engaged in a project that, irrespective of its moral worth, was doomed to failure. Battling against a hostile and indifferent universe whose cataclysmic upheavals consume the just and the 8 unjust alike, […] she could only conclude that death and the chaos of nature will eventually claim her and all others like her. Not to grasp the horror of the inevitable annihilation that a purposeless nature poses to a moral yet finite individual could only be an intentional blindness. It is to continue to engage in a battle towards the acquisition of virtue, the inevitable outcome of which is known beforehand; as such, it is to display the courage of a fool. If she reasons correctly, she will see that given the premise that she is merely the product of a blind and chaotic nature, the moral law […] would thus have been exposed as an idle and fantastic dream. 38 As we shall see, Kant makes several seemingly interconnected but highly questionable claims presented in some kind of slippery slope argument. Kant's argument can be reconstructed as follows. Its premises are: (P1) the amoral nature of the world, the failings and sufferings of the righteous and the futility of their moral endeavours offer no perspectives for establishing the highest good; (P2) moral theism offers the only concept, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, intelligent and just moral world ruler, for rendering the possibility of the highest good intelligible; (P3) atheism rejects the concept described in (P2). Its main conclusions are:
(C1) an atheist has to abandon the highest good; and (C2) atheism leads to moral despair. It is this argument that I challenge. My strategy consists in questioning and undercutting Kant's premises as well as in distinguishing between an 'ideal-transcendent' account of the highest good as the proportionate and systematic union of virtue and happiness and a 'historicalimmanent' account of the highest good as the creation of a moral world characterised by happiness conditioned by virtue and morality, which will be far more appealing for even the most rabid atheist. himself -because of the authority of the moral law directing an agent to pursue the highest good -to embrace some non-theistic, moral-teleological schema that suffices to be able to think the possibility of the highest good. An atheist can assume an intelligent, rational world order through which a moral teleology necessary for establishing the highest good can be presupposed. For example, Fichte holds that the morally well-disposed subject believes that the world in which he acts is in conformity with his moral actions without believing in (the idea of) a personal and transcendent God over and above this impersonal, rational and teleological world order. Theravada Buddhism embraces the concept of karma as a moralteleological mechanism that is operative in nature and that lets us think a harmony of virtue and happiness but that does not appeal to a God. By analogy, an atheist may dismiss moral theism and yet ground the possibility of the highest good in some (unknown) moralteleological mechanism in nature through which the natural and the moral world are brought into harmony and through which the highest good will be attained by virtue of moral agency.
A drawback to such an account seems to be that it is less cognitively determinate and specific than Kant's moral theism regarding the precise mechanism of how the highest good is to be brought about. Yet, as Byrne notices, avoiding commitment to 'metaphysical assumptions containing rich pictures of the possible mechanism behind moral teleology is more "Critical" than Kant's own apparatus of postulates.' 40 Hence, an atheist embracing the possibility of a non-theistic conception of the realisation of the highest good need not necessarily succumb into moral despair.
Moreover, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant himself seems to consider the possibility of a non-theistic, natural-teleological conception of the realisation of the highest good:
I said above that in accordance with a mere course of nature in the world happiness in exact conformity with moral worth is not to be expected and is to be held impossible, and that therefore the possibility of the highest good […] can be granted only on the presupposition of a moral author in the world.
[…] In fact, the impossibility referred to is merely subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to conceive, in the mere course of nature, a connection so exactly proportioned and thoroughly purposive between events occurring in the world in accordance with such different laws, although, as with everything else in nature that is purposive, it nevertheless cannot prove -that is, Both moral theism and natural teleology are thus two objectively equal ways to represent the possibility of the highest good. The difference between these two options is that the latter is cognitively less determinate and specific: it falls beyond the scope of our reason to conceive how natural teleological laws may establish an exact proportion of happiness and virtue, whereas faith in God as moral world ruler does seem to provide us with a more vivid and concrete account of the possibility of such a harmony. Kant thus concludes that human beings will prefer moral theism for conceiving the possibility of the highest good because the 11 postulate of God is subjectively more comprehensible to our human cognitive faculties than a view according to which the highest good would be in conformity with mere laws of nature. 41 Yet, it is important to keep in mind that Kant himself concedes the validity of appealing to a natural teleological world order as an objective alternative for considering the possibility of the highest good without appealing to a supersensible entity. As such, Kant implicitly provides the atheist with a non-theistic account for affirming the possibility of the highest good. And although Kant thinks that moral theism is subjectively more attractive or persuasive for human reason by offering a more specific and determinate account of how the highest good may be brought about, he has no conclusive objective arguments for tipping the balance in favour of moral theism.
However, appealing to some non-theistic, metaphysical schemes such as a teleological world order for guaranteeing the possibility of the highest good may be a leap to far for some radical atheists as it still relies on some kind of metaphysical faith. Moreover, an atheist may also advocate a Darwinian view on nature and reject the existence of a teleological world order.
Yet, even such atheists can still uphold the possibility of the highest good by adopting the moderate epistemic stance that -in spite of what Kant thinks -the impossibility of the highest good is not sufficiently or objectively proven and hence recognise -because of their commitment to the moral law -that the highest good is something valuable to be pursued. As long as there is no sufficient, objective proof for the impossibility of the highest good, there is no reason to regard our moral efforts for realising it as irrational, especially if it is our wellconsidered free and rational choice to put great value on this moral ideal. This sceptical rationality claim yields a stance that is genuinely 'critical' and that is more consistent with present-day scientific insights and growing secular pluralism in ethics.
The idea that it is not irrational to pursue the highest good as long as its impossibility is not proven is not unfamiliar to Kant's philosophy. Both in On the Common Saying and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant contends that in the case of an end set as a duty it suffices that its possibility is not demonstrably impossible in order to render its pursuit rational. 42 In On the Common Saying, he argues that the thought that a moral end has not yet been realised and for this reason will probably be never realised does not in itself justify to abandon this end 'as long as its achievement is not demonstrably impossible' (TP VIII:309-10). Kant thus argues that if an end is morally valuable, the absence of proof of the impossibility of it suffices to render our efforts in its behalf rational. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that our duty consists in acting in accordance with the idea of a moral end 'even if there is not the least theoretical probability that it can be achieved, as long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated either' (MS VI:354). Once more, Kant contends that if it is a duty to achieve an end, all that is needed to make the pursuit of that end rational is not a guarantee that it can be achieved, but rather the absence of a demonstration that it cannot be achieved. The idea that rational agency directed to pursuing an end set as a duty only requires that the impossibility of the end is not proven -rather than that its possibility has to be proven by postulating God as moral world ruler -provides the atheist with a genuine and rationally stable alternative to moral theism in order not the abandon the highest good.
However, in defence of Kant, it might be argued that the atheist's approach keeps it dangling how the systematicity and proportionality of virtue and happiness as core feature of the highest good can be guaranteed. Although it suffices to be convinced that the attainment of the highest good is not per se impossible in order to be able to rationally pursue it, one might question whether such an approach suffices for conceiving a systematic and necessary harmony -instead of a merely contingent aggregate -of virtue and happiness in the highest good. It is precisely this feature of systematicity that Kant thinks a righteous atheist like Spinoza lacks in conceptualising the possibility of the highest good. Yet, as we shall see, there are also strands in Kant's philosophy that do not primarily emphasise this systematic and proportionate union of virtue and happiness, but rather advocate an account of the highest good as a moral world of virtue and happiness conditioned by morality. Furthermore, we can stick to the argument that as long as there is no proof for the impossibility per se of some harmonious system of virtue and happiness, there is no reason to conclude that we act irrationally in striving for such a system. With respect to the question of how such a system might be conceived and thought, it seems that Kant's ethico-theology provides us with a cognitively determinate and -perhaps above all -a psychologically reassuring, hence subjectively more attractive view on the realisability of the highest good:
The cognition of God must therefore complete morality, but it must not first determine whether something is morally good or a duty for me! This I must judge from the nature of things in accordance with a possible system of ends; and I must be just as certain of it as I am that a triangle has three angles. Surely, the world taken as a realm of nature is completely amoral and we cannot deny that we are faced with sufferings and failures even of the most virtuous and righteous people. But, contra Kant, I contend that there are enough reasons to be more optimistic in this regard.
Despite all its cruelties, mankind's history has also abundantly shown its moral successes, such as the abolition of slavery, the spreading of democratic regimes, the promotion of equality between men and women, the institution of international human rights organizations, the right to free public opinion and speech, and so on. As Denis rightly notes: 'historical-immanent' conception of the highest good as the creation of a moral world of virtue and happiness conditioned by morality, the possibility of which depends on humanbut not divine -agency. 46 The former account is 'ideal-transcendent' because it refers to the unconditioned final end of pure practical reason as a 'mere object of thought', 47 and because the intelligibility of its realisation depends on assuming the existence of a moral world ruler and the immortality of the soul. Hence, it is also a 'theistic' account of the highest good. The latter account is 'historical-immanent' because it refers to a social end to be pursued collectively by the human race in this world over the course of history. Hence, it is also a 'non-theistic' account of the highest good. While Kant's 'ideal-transcendent' account as happiness in perfect proportion to virtue is predominant in his philosophy, 48 some passages (TP VIII:279-80; RGV VI:5, 97-8; KU V:450, 453) suggest a 'secular', 'historicalimmanent' account of the highest good as 'the existence of rational beings subject to moral laws' (KU V:444) or, as Denis puts it, 'a world of virtue, justice, and happiness, and flourishing rational capacities'. 49 This account of the highest good does not so much stress the systematic proportionality between happiness and virtue, but rather happiness in conformity to or conditioned by moral agency and virtue. This account acknowledges the importance and necessity of happiness but makes its value dependent upon the morality of the maxims on which it is pursued. 50 Hence, the realisation of the 'historical-immanent' highest good does not depend on the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, and offers a more fruitful account that is suitable to serve as the end of our autonomous moral conduct and that lies entirely within the scope of our human agency. Adopting this 'historical-immanent' account of the highest good provides even the most rabid atheist with a legitimate alternative to moral theism for affirming the possibility of the highest good and hence for resisting moral despair.
CONCLUSIONS
In spite of his rejection of the traditional metaphysical proofs of God's existence, Kant defends moral theism, i.e. a subjective, rational conviction in the existence of God as a moral world ruler on behalf of the intelligibility of the highest good as the final end of the moral law.
In the third Critique, Kant argues that atheism leads to moral despair by rejecting moral theism as the sole cognitively determinate and psychologically reassuring view for rendering the highest good intelligible. Yet an atheist can invoke different strategies for refuting Kant's argument: (1) adopting some non-theistic, moral-teleological world conception through which the highest good can be conceived, (2) adopting a natural teleology through which nature itself is conceived as the ground for the highest good, (3) adopting the modest epistemological stance that striving for the highest good is not irrational as long as its impossibility is not sufficiently demonstrated, (4) showing that Kant has not objectively proven the impossibility of the highest good in case of a lack of faith in God, and (5) appealing to an alternative historical-immanent account of the highest good as the creation of a moral world of virtue and happiness conditioned by morality.
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1 For a careful analysis of Kant's appreciation and refutation of these proofs, see Allen W. Wood, Kant's 
